General

The general theme of this submission is an appeal for fresh thinking. Australia needs to prepare for the next war, not the last war and must think like an aggressor to identify our true strategic, economic and military vulnerabilities. We address the Review’s terms of reference including scope, Australia’s future strategic challenges, force posture structure and disposition, the integrated investment program, defence policy and plans in respect sovereign capability requirements for preparedness, and mobilisation.

Scope of the Review

The stated purpose of the Review is to “consider the priority of investment ……to optimise Defence capability and posture….to 2032-33 and beyond”. The Review is tasked to address the investments required to support mobilisation to meet any perceived threat including ‘any other matters deemed appropriate. Thus, the terms of reference are broad and are not constrained by the current peacetime budget, presently around 2% of GDP.

During Australia’s last high-level conflict, World War Two, defence spending as a percentage of GDP approached 40%. Investment remained in the range of 8% to 5% of GDP for much of the 1950’s and 1960’s at the height of the cold war. An assumption the Review may make is that, in the event of a sudden adverse deterioration in our strategic circumstances, Defence spending would be likely to increase significantly.

It is therefore hoped that this Review will, as its first step, deliver a comprehensive reckoning of the capabilities we require to meet any foreseen threat without the constraint of current budget settings. As a second step, we expect the Review to consider and prioritise the current Integrated Investment Programme based on what the country has budgeted in the current financial plan. This Defence Strategic Review therefore presents an opportunity for frank and fearless advice to government and to the Australian people about the challenge before us, and what we should invest to insure ourselves against an uncertain future.

While we must prepare for high level conflict on a global scale requiring full mobilisation of the nation’s warfighting potential, including the threat of Australia being targeted in a nuclear exchange between major powers, this should not dominate our strategic thinking. The ADF must simultaneously be organised and dispositioned for unconventional operations in the grey zone, limited conventional war, Ukraine style undeclared ‘special military operations and other variations of conflict in our region. In determining what capabilities we need we should not be constrained in the first instance by the status quo, by the risk of group thinking resulting from presumed wisdom emanating from existing institutions and ‘think tanks’, or by budget constraints.

Strategic Challenges

Indirect Approaches. Australia can be attacked and significantly damaged without a shot being fired, by indirect means. Cyber-attacks can disable the banking system, ground aircraft, and bring the nation’s transportation system to a halt, thereby emptying supermarket shelves, seizing the economy, and causing mass panic and dislocation. The nation’s satellite and communications system, submarine cables and connectivity can be destroyed, damaged, or disrupted. Our fuel supplies can be cut from overseas suppliers by blockade or interdiction, grounding the nation’s vehicle fleets and industry. Our energy, water and other essential infrastructure can be attacked, destroyed, or dislocated, electronically and remotely. Australia can be humiliated, disrupted, and thrust into chaos by an adversary using non-kinetic attacks. Preparing the Australian people for such a war and building resilience within the economy and the community must for part of our Defence preparedness.

The East. The bulk of ADF bases and capabilities are along the eastern seaboard, facing the pacific. In response to growing influence by the Government of China within pacific nations, our government has energised Australia’s relationships in the South Pacific. Australia’s standing amongst pacific nations will partly be determined by the ADF presence in the region and the relationships it maintains. It is in Australia’s interests to secure access to air and naval bases in the South Pacific to guard our eastern approaches and our lines of communication across the pacific to the US. But it is difficult to imagine a serious military threat during a high-level conflict emanating from the east. A case can consequently be made that the ADF is at present disproportionately located, in the wrong place.

The North. The prospect of state-on-state conflict involving attacks from the air, by sea and incursions into the Australian mainland has not been forced upon Australian Government since World War Two, but it is important not to prepare for the last war. The conventional military threat from Imperial Japan in 1941-42 came from the north through Papua New Guinea (PNG), Indonesia and the South Pacific Islands. The Imperial Japanese navy, air and land forces sought to secure oil, and other natural resources to our north for strategic and economic gain. Subsequent Australian defence strategic guidance has maintained the view that the threat in a variety of forms will come from the north and significant ADF medium to high level war fighting capabilities are presently dispositioned to cover this approach. But a future adversary may think and act differently in response to completely different strategic objectives, including an intent to attack Australia without involving Indonesia or PNG.

The West. Australia’s west coast, not the north is both the richest target for attack and the most strategically vulnerable. Over fifty percent of Australian export wealth departs from west coast ports and most the nation’s iron ore, minerals, oil and gas depart through west coast waters, principally to China whose economy depends upon these vital resources. Australian refined petroleum imports upon which our economy, our transport and aviation industries and our defence force are dangerously dependent, transit through the region. The mineral and energy resources within the region are valuable assets, highly attractive targets to an aggressor. The vast expanse of the Indian ocean affords an attacker opportunity for surface or sub surface strikes, raids, land incursions or air and maritime interdiction designed to hurt the Australian economy. An attack to disrupt or seize energy or mineral resources in the northwest by a major pawer may seem an unlikely proposition, particularly within the ten-year window of this Review, but it was a grab for resources which motivated Imperial Japan to seize Indonesia in 1941-42. Though strategically critical for Australia, the northwest if far removed from ADF assets and from reinforcement, and road rail and communication links to the region are few and distant.

Australia’s Offshore Territories. The Indian Ocean territories of Christmas Island and Cocos (keeling) Islands and the Ashmore and Cartier Islands lay off the nations west coast. Each of the undefended territories are vulnerable to a ‘Falklands’ style seizure by a foreign power designed to humiliate and threaten Australia by seizing and militarising the island chain. Defending these territories will require the ADF to be positioned and structured appropriately, including close cooperation with our ASEAN neighbors to the northwest.

Observation. We should not prepare for the last war but should think like a contemporary first world aggressor about how to best to achieve strategic outcomes by attacking and damaging Australia’s economy and prestige, beyond the effective reach of the ADF’s ability to respond. The epicenter of Australia’s economic wealth in now the northwest, a shift which has made the west coast not the north coast, our nations key vulnerability. As the west is even more remote than the north from present ADF bases and capabilities along the eastern seaboard, we should relocate ADF assets into permanent bases along the northwest coast. The ADF must be able to defend our Indian Ocean territories. Our most important international relationship to achieve these goals will not be with the Unites States but with the Republic of Indonesia, with whom we must develop the closest of strategic ties.

Conclusion. The ADF needs to maintain close working relationships, with countries covering our northwestern approaches including where possible, establish joint and combined basing’s such as the present Butterworth facility in Malaysia or in Indonesia. If we are to prepare for a threat to Australia’s territory or critical economic interests, a naval base and permanent air force base should be established at suitable airfields and ports in the northwest coast of Australia, with corresponding infrastructure and sustainment capability. The ADF must be able to defend our west coast-based military and economic assets like fleet base HNAS Stirling from air, sea, land and missile attack with superior Intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR), early warning and locally manufactured and sustainable missile defenses.

Force Posture Structure and Disposition

Missile Capabilities and ISR. The most important shortfall in the ADF’s capability is medium and long-range missiles to sink ships and strike at strategic targets at long-range including a potential adversaries’ home bases. The ADF should be able to conduct sustained strategic strike not only from sea and air but from the Australian mainland and our territories, using mobile platforms. Equally of concern is the ADF’s present inability to independently detect and destroy large numbers of incoming missiles including hypersonic attacks, targeting Australian bases and capabilities. Australia cannot afford to be dependent an any foreign government for the detection and targeting of incoming threats or for supply and sustainment of missile and counter missile capabilities, which must be manufactured locally under Australian Government control.

Cyber Warfare. The second most important capability required by the ADF is an ability to protect the nation’s information systems while attacking and destroying those of an adversary. The first task of Artificial Intelligence (AI) will be to assist with both tasks. It is consequently vital that Australia is a leader of nations in cyber, AI and ICT technology. Capabilities need to be sovereign, protected and under Australian Government control.

Maritime Capabilities. Nuclear submarines must be a mainstay of maritime capability, but we may need more than eight, most certainly based on both the west coast and the east coast to disperse the capability. The number of Offshore Patrol Vessels (OPV) should be increased with additional vessels armed with anti-ship missiles, autonomous unmanned systems, and anti-submarine capabilities to provide a shorter term ADF capability particularly in the defence of Australia. The fact that the ADF cannot deploy the fleet offshore including amphibious operations with air cover, and that it cannot deploy a balanced force to participate in combined operations without relying on another allied navy for air cover, leaves Australia dependent upon the navies of foreign allied governments to conduct serious conventional maritime operations in the indo-pacific.

Projection of Maritime Capability. New thinking might reconsider the case for at least two light aircraft carriers equipped with F35B short takeoff and landing variant aircraft. The presumed wisdom that this capability is detectable and vulnerable in a high-level conflict needs to be balanced by the fact that advances in technology mean fixed air force bases are even more detectable and vulnerable to missile attack. Conflict in the grey zone, in the pacific, in support of regional allies in Southeast Asia and in protection of offshore territories and in situations short of global war provide instances where a light carrier capability could be regionally decisive. A mobile naval air capability provides another risk calculation for an adversary at any level of conflict. The acquisition of such a capability would lift Australia’s prestige and standing within our region of interest and would signal to allies and potential adversaries that the nation is serious maintaining a truly sovereign capability rather than providing minor component parts of a larger allies’ naval force. It is noteworthy that allies are building such capabilities. The argument that the cost of a light carrier capability is prohibitive needs to be retested.

Air Capabilities. To reinforce Australia’s capability to conduct strategic strike to deter a potential aggressor we should purchase a small fleet of up to twelve B21 ‘Raider’ bombers. The capability, with US Government agreement, could be provided at a manageable cost in the medium term and could offset strike capability delays in the AUKUS nuclear submarine acquisition. Modern warfighting technology has demonstrated that fixed air bases, infrastructure and even individual aircraft in individual parking bays are at risk of missile or drone strikes. In Ukraine aircraft have quickly been dispersed for survivability. Australia should acquire additional fighter aircraft of the F35B class to enable the distribution, and survivability of assets at concealable and unexpected forward locations within Australia or to basses shared with allies in the indo pacific, or at sea. Command and control of air power under dispersed arrangements must be built into solutions.

Land Capabilities. Mobility, protection, and firepower will remain the key future capabilities for the army. Sufficient tanks, infantry fighting vehicles and other armed vehicles under Land 400 need to be retained in numbers sufficient to ensure a base capability for a mobilized army is in place. The logical place to base armoured forces is the northwestern Australia where a raid or lodgement in a high-level conflict is possible. In the northwest, the army’s reach would need to include offshore oil and gas platforms and vital at sea, road, industrial and rail infrastructure requiring advanced air, amphibious and ground mobility. Army must maintain large scale unit and battle group level air mobile and amphibious capabilities. Modern long-range artillery including long range multiple rocket launchers will need to be acquired.

Special Forces. A most important land capability Australia will require in all levels of conflict will be the reconnaissance, surveillance, unconventional warfare and strategic strike capabilities of special forces provided by the Special Air Service Regiment and the two Commando Regiments and supporting arms and services.

Space. Australia must be able to design, manufacture and launch its own satellites and space systems independent of any other nation.

Observation. State of the art ISR and medium and long-range missile and counter missile defenses are the missing link in Australia’s defenses closely followed by cyber warfare defensive and offensive capabilities. Maritime capabilities are the next line of defence, but we require more ships in the near term with aggressive capabilities while longer term frigate and submarines builds are completed. Apart from the existing Collins submarine capability we cannot independently project naval power offshore where there is an air threat because our fleet lacks integrated air cover from light fleet carriers. Our air capability would be enhanced by the acquisition of a strategic bomber capability and fighter capabilities capable of flexible operations away from fixed bases, offshore and at sea. Our army lacks the protection, mobility and firepower required to fight and survive on the Australian mainland or elsewhere and it is mainly located in the wrong place covering an unlikely eastern approach.

Conclusion. Prioritise missile and counter missile sovereign capability including related ISR, targeting and space capabilities. Prioritise cyber defence and attack. Purchase more OPV’s or similar vessels to be equipped with anti-ship missiles, air defenses, anti-submarine capability and autonomous systems to meet the immediate needs of navy in the short to medium term. Reexamine the case for two light fleet aircraft carriers to build maritime capability and resilience in all levels of conflict. Consider more nuclear submarines in a continuous build programme. Negotiate with the US to purchase a fleet of twelve B21 Bombers. Purchase addition F35B fighters and develop infrastructure and systems to enable dispersal of the fighter force to safe bases in a high-level conflict.

Preparedness and Mobilisation.

General. A Defence Strategic Review which does not include the challenge of mobilisation will be incomplete. There is little debate and few plans in Australia about mobilisation which might see the ADF to expand to size of up to 1 million people. This capability review should recommend funding for the detailed manpower, training and logistics planning required for success. Australia should have a clear sense of the steps and resourced required to expand in response to a major high-level conflict.

Manpower Skills and Training. The system of schools and training establishments for recruit training and initial employment training is likely to prove unsustainable in the event of mobilisation for lack of skilled instructors and staff. A system and plan for rapid growth in Army, Navy and Air Force recruitment and training needs to be put in place. Systems for the recognition of civilian qualifications in time of war need resolving. The demands upon the existing Army Navy and Air Force to train an expanding ADF, will constrain the deployable force and tie up infrastructure, assets and resources.

Reserves. The Defence Force Reserves system particularly in Army was changed in recent decades to focus on a small well-trained reserve, suited to ‘rounding out’ the regular army for war on terror operations in the middle east. The model is unlikely to work for mid to high level operations in the indo pacific and for mobilisation. Funding to reorganize the reserves may need to be prioritised to ensure a basis for expansion in the event of mobilisation.

Logistics. A system for stockpiling immediately needed equipment’s from uniforms to small arms may be needed to sustain mobilisation. Attention will need to be given to sovereign manufacturing and industrial capability to meet the demands of mobilisation on the basis that allies are likely to be mobilising concurrently, thus generating their own demands on industry, and lines of overseas communication including peacetime supply chains may be at risk.

Supply Chain Assessment. Multiple ADF supply chains have connections to China and Taiwan, or third parties with suppliers based in China. These sources of supply are unreliable in the event of a major conflict and could result in the ADF being left without supply and Australian industry not in a position to fill the gap at short notice. Off shoring of ADF supply chains denies capacity to local manufacturers, putting at risk the nations’ ability to meet its manufacturing needs on mobilisation. An example of this risk is the military textiles regime where in peace time nearly 50% of the ADF’s needs are being manufactured in China or connected places. ASCA has prepared a case study on this example at enclosure 3. A supply chain assessment of all ADF needs should be conducted to identify vulnerabilities at the onset of conflict. All military textiles, uniforms and personal equipment’s should be made in Australia to guarantee capability for mobilisation. Encl 3

Observation and Conclusion. The ADF is poorly prepared for the scale and urgent pace of mobilisation that is likely in the event of a sustained mid to high level conflict. A funded plan of action is needed to ensure we can find the people, develop the training systems, the skills base and logistics capacity to mobilise an ADF of one million people if needed. The Defence Force Reserves need to be re-tasked and reorganised into a base for mobilisation rather than a round-out capability for the regular force. Our plans for mobilisation need to be made on the basis that the regular force will be committed to operations and unavailable. A supply chain assessment in domains like military clothing and textiles should be conducted to ensure links to China or Taiwan are not at risk during a conflict and that on shore manufacturing capacity is adequate to guarantee mobilisation.

Integrated Investment Program – Sovereign Capability Requirements

Sovereign Control of Capability. We encourage the review to take a holistic approach to our ADF structure, posture and preparedness. Australia takes an adversary’s defence capabilities seriously when it demonstrates it can design, build, launch and sustain at home its own military power. The reverse applies. If Australia is dependent on allies or foreign multinational prime manufacturers to design, build and sustain its ships, aircraft and combat systems, or upon imported products, parts, weapons or IP supplied from overseas, we demonstrate to an adversary that our ADF is dependent upon other foreign governments to fight. University research at enclosure 1, funded by ASCA examines the challenges facing the nation in respect of sovereign capability. Encl 1

National Power. National power is determined not only by the ADF’s hard power but by the soft power of Australia’s national wealth and technical competency. Wars are won or lost largely on logistics enabled by national GDP and industrial capacity. If national wealth is enhanced by a vibrant local defence industry capable of building and sustaining our needs, a different warning is sent to a potential adversary. Sovereign capability also signals to allies that we will not be a burden or overly reliant upon them during a crisis, during which their own resources are likely to be diverted exclusively to meet their own national needs. Government spending on defence capability can both defend the nation and build the nation’s economic resilience. The nation provides an educated and heathy workforce to man the Army, Navy and Air Force and industry and labour to build and sustain the fighting equipment the ADF needs to do its work. Without an industry capability there is no ADF capability!

Public Confidence in Funding Defence Procurement. Defence planners need to understand that the government prioritises defence spending alongside other pressing budget demands like health and education. Apart from the self-reliance sovereign capability contributes to our war fighting capabilities, spending the taxpayer’s money on locally produced manufactures, goods and services builds national wealth by encouraging science research and development along with jobs and investment. In turn this helps the Australian taxpayer to understand the value for money they receivefrom their investment in the Defence Budget. Offshoring the Australian taxpayers’ dollars to create jobs and enterprise in someone else’s country is a recipe for public resentment, a loss of social license and constrained defence budgets. The more sovereign capability the easier it is for Defence Ministers to secure budget from competing demands upon the public purse.

Air Capabilities. Australia must optimise its share of spend on aircraft acquisitions and linked capabilities by requiring local industry participation where practicable, and by entering international supply chains where more complex systems are acquired. Local spending on aircraft related sustainment must be optimised to Australian companies under Australian Government control. Australian based international primes must be genuinely Australian Government controlled and intellectual property must be retained in Australia. While we can be reliant on other allied governments to operate our air capabilities, we cannot become dependent. At risk is our ability to defend ourselves independently.

Maritime Capabilities. The nuclear AUKUS submarine must be built in Australia, apart from the nuclear module. The Hunter Class frigate should similarly be built locally with all IP retained. Sustainment for the fleet should be localised. The goal of a continuous shipbuilding industry should be maintained so that the industry and workforce is sustainable. Attainment of this goal requires that big ship and submarine manufacture be concentrated at one port, which sustainment in Perth and Sydney and at other locations. The recent decision to build a second $4.3 Bn dry dock facility in Henderson WA “to build and maintain large ships” duplicates existing large ship and submarine building facilities in Adelaide SA. Whether Australia can sustain two large ship building docks needs to be questioned by this Review. If it determines that Australia has enough deal flow to support only one large ship building yard, this $4.3 Bn investment in Perth could be reduced to a dock for sustainment or redirected entirely to other Defence priorities.

Land Capabilities. Often the easiest to manufacture locally the army’s vehicles, clothing and equipment should be a sovereign capability. Up to fifty percent of the ADF’s military textiles and clothing is still manufactured in China or countries with links to Chinese supply chains, all unlikely to be sustainable in a high-level conflict or during mobilisation. Combat vehicles need to be built and sustained in Australia along with small arms and complex ammunition and artillery. The war in Ukraine has highlighted the need for a sovereign control of manufacturing of complex land systems and has demonstrated how swiftly stocks can be depleted during warlike operations.

Defence Policy and Plans

The Diarchy. The ADF is led by the CDF and by the Secretary, both heavily involved in defence procurement, logistics and industry policy and capability. On mobilisation and in the event of a sustained high-level conflict it is unlikely that the uniformed arm of defence will be able to continue its present level of engagement in capability and acquisition, a conclusion evident from our experience during both world wars. The CDF and the services will need to war fight and the civilian side of defence will need to manage industry capability. Retired servicemen and women may round out the civilian capability providing continuity and experience to the processes. Procurement, shipbuilding, aircraft and vehicle manufacture and other defence industry manufacturing will need to be carried out by Australian Industry under the guidance of civilian leadership, until capabilities are handed over to the CDF. We need to organise in peace as we will need to in war.

A National Ship Building Authority. The Australian naval shipbuilding capability has been haphazard, inefficient and costly over decades. The first cause has been an intermittent commitment by government to indigenous shipbuilding resulting in a ‘stop-start’, project by project build schedule with long gaps between production runs. A second cause has been poor management by ADF officers who are not trained or experienced in managing multibillion dollar manufacturing enterprises. The entire naval shipbuilding and sustainment effort including the design, manufacture and sustainment of naval surface ships and submarines needs to be managed as one enterprise run by experienced businesspeople adept at mega projects, who coordinates budget, infrastructure, industry and labour. A National Shipbuilding Authority should manage the national enterprise under the oversight of a sub committee of cabinet. The Navy should be confined to specifying the capability and weapon systems required and war fighting with the vessels. This idea is outlined in detail in ASCA’s submission the Senate Inquiry into naval Shipbuilding attached at enclosure2. Encl 2

Civil Defence Corps. A pattern has emerged where the ADF is regularly called upon to assist the civil authorities with bush fire and flood relief and during other emergencies such as the recent pandemic. In the event of war requiring partial or full mobilisation, it is unlikely the ADF will be able to assist with such natural disasters or collateral damage from the effects of war. Even in peacetime the demands of these deployments detract from the ADF’s warfighting responsibilities. This review should recommend dedicated funding and action to create a national civil defence corps to work in coordination with other federal and state agencies to deal with natural disasters and the consequences of war on infrastructure and people. The resulting organisation should establish peacetime and wartime capabilities and must provide its own mobilisation plan to meet the needs of high-level conflict. Collaboration with the states fire and emergency services, police, health services and first responders along with volunteer non-government organisations (NGO) will be essential.

Conclusion

This Review is an opportunity to clearly spell out anew, the threat we face and the capability we must build to deal with it without the constraints of past wisdom or present budget settings, including a pathway to mobilisation. ADF capabilities and posture require reform along with Defence policy and plans. ASCA welcomes the opportunity to offer up some fresh ideas on investments, savings, and the reordering of force structure, posture and preparedness and would be delighted to speak with the Review team about the ideas contained in this submission is appropriate and if time permits.

Summary of Recommendations

It is recommended that the Review.

1. The threat. Consider whether the territories and the mainland to the west and northwest of Australia are now our most vulnerable and at-risk approaches, rather than the north?
2. Relocation of ADF Assets to the Northwest. Determine whether a permanent naval base, airfield and army base in the northwest should be established with relevant ADF assets relocated accordingly?
3. Missiles. Prioritise missile and counter missile sovereign capability including related ISR, targeting and space capabilities.
4. Cyber. Prioritise cyber defence and attack to protect the nation’s information systems while destroying those of an adversary.
5. New naval vessels. Recommend the purchase of more OPV’s or similar vessels to be equipped with anti-ship missiles, air warfare capabilities, anti-submarine capabilities and autonomous systems to meet the immediate needs of navy in the short to medium term.
6. Anti-missile Defenses at Fixed bases. Agree that fixed air and naval bases in Australia are now vulnerable to precision missile attack from extreme range changing the nature of war, requiring anti-missile defence and dispersal of assets.
7. Light Aircraft Carriers. Considering the vulnerability of fixed bases and for other reasons, reexamine the case for a light aircraft carrier capability with associated F35B aircraft.
8. Strategic Strike. Recommend that the government negotiate with the US to purchase a fleet of twelve B21 Bombers.
9. Dispersed Fighter Force. Purchase addition F35B fighters and develop infrastructure and systems to enable dispersal of the fighter force and other aircraft as appropriate to safe alternating bases in a high-level conflict.
10. Mobilisation. Propose a funded plan of action to ensure we can recruit the people, develop the training systems, the skills base and logistics capacity to swiftly mobilise an ADF of one million people if needed.
11. Supply Chain assessment. A supply chain assessment in domains like military clothing and textiles should be conducted to ensure links to China or Taiwan are not at risk during a conflict and that on shore manufacturing capacity is adequate to guarantee mobilisation
12. The Defence Force Reserves. Propose that the Defence Force Reserves be re-tasked and reorganised into a base for mobilisation, rather than a round-out capability for the regular force.
13. Sovereign Capability. Prioritise sovereign industrial capability for submarine and naval shipbuilding and for defence procurement more broadly.
14. A Single Shipyard for Large Vessels. Question whether Australia can sustain two large ship building docks and if it is determined that Australia has enough deal flow to support only one large ship building yard, recommend that the $4.3 Bn investment in a second large vessel shipbuilding dock for construction of new vessels in Perth be reduced to a dock for sustainment or the funds redirected entirely to other Defence priorities.
15. Civilian Control of Defence Industries. Support a new approach to defence industry, defence procurement, logistics and industry policy and capability which replaces uniformed persons with civilians.
16. A Naval Shipbuilding Authority. Support the creation of a National Naval Ship Building authority.
17. A Civil Defence Corps. Support the creation of a Civil Defence Corps for peace and war.
18. Research. Note ASCA’s research (Encl 1) on sovereign capability and our submission to the Senate Inquiry into Naval Shipbuilding (Encl 2)

Download the Submission to the Defence Strategic Review as a PDF

28 Oct 2022
Hon Martin Hamilton-Smith
Director Australian Sovereign Capability Alliance
PO Box 65
Stirling SA 5152

Footnote: The author is a former Minister for Defence and Space Industries South Australia 2014-18
Enclosures: 1. Australian Sovereign Capability and Supply Chain resilience- Research by
Flinders University for ASCA
2. Submission to Senate references Committee Inquiry into Sovereign naval
Shipbuilding by ASCA
3. Military Textiles-the Case for Sovereign Capability